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The Current Landscape of American Religion: Diversity, Individuation, and the Implications for an Aging 
Population. 
Rhys H. Williams 





Religion is a vast and vibrant part of American society, continually evolving as the American 
people change. This makes generalizations somewhat hazardous, as our society continues to expand and 
diversify, and religion does as well.  However, one can identify a few overall trends in the religious field 
in the United States, some part of deep historical patterns and some more recent.  These form the context 
in which any particular set of develops in religion, spirituality, and aging occur.  This chapter will argue 
that the major development in contemporary American religion is the intersection of ‘diversity’ and 
‘individuation.’   Each of those two processes, and the two together, are producing ever more options for 
Americans in terms of: a) organizational commitment; and b) religious beliefs and practices.  People have 
more religious options from which to choose, and more autonomy to make such choices in terms of their 
individual wants, needs, and preferences.  And in turn, diversification and individuation are putting ever 
more pressure on Americans to understand and legitimate their religious involvement along those lines.  
More options are available, and there is more expectation that people will make choices for themselves. 
In terms of religious traditions, there is more diversity within the United States than ever before, 
with substantial numbers of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and religious 'nones' now a part of the 
population in addition to ever more variations of Christianity and Judaism.  Moreover, within each 
tradition there are more options based on more cultural varieties of religious practice; so, for example, 
Orthodox Christians can find Russian, and Greek, and Ukrainian Orthodox communities in many major 
cities, or there are congregations of Sunni, Shi’a, and Sufi Muslims.  This expands the opportunities to 
tailor various aspects of the religious tradition in order to fit commitment and practice to one’s individual 
situation.  Thus, there is more religious “hybridity,” and more cultural pressures for individuals to fit 
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traditions to themselves in the quest for religious and personal ‘authenticity.’  For new American 
immigrants of many religious backgrounds this proliferation of options has often led to clear generational 
tensions between the first and second/third generations in terms of how they practice their faith.  
But even native-born American Christians, who continue to be a majority in the country, are not 
immune to the processes of diversification and individuation.  For example, there are increasingly fewer 
people in the pews of religious congregations, as even those who continue to identify with a denomination 
or tradition seem increasingly likely to believe that organizational involvement is relatively optional 
(Chaves, 2017, 48-55).  Moreover, less authority is being granted to denominational authority structures 
and religious traditions by people who are in the pews (Chaves, 2017, 59-61).  Increasing numbers of 
people consider themselves "spiritual but not religious" – while the numbers of such folks may be small 
overall, they are increasing and they come from demographics that once were the bulwark support 
populations for traditional congregations (Chaves, 2017, 8).  Finally, there are millions of regular 
congregational members who carefully sift their faith's religious teachings, incorporating some into their 
own belief system, but paying little attention to others.  All this is challenging the ways in which religious 
organizations work, and what it means to call oneself “religious.”   
Finally, in considering these trends and their effects on religion, spirituality, and aging, an 
important contextual factor is that American society is experiencing increasing generational segregation 
(Hagestad & Uhlenberg, 2005; Uhlenberg &	De Jong Gierveld, 2004).  For over a century educational 
institutions have been sorted by age cohorts. Combined with ever-faster trends in pop culture, from music 
to slang, the age-range of peer cohorts narrows.  Also, family structures are decreasingly multi-
generational, and even residential neighborhoods are not immune to this process.  While there may be a 
recent surge in post-college twenty-somethings returning to their parents’ homes for a few years, family 
groupings are nonetheless smaller than they once were.  This is especially true as people age, as older 
Americans are increasingly likely to be living with age and generational peers rather than with extended 
multi-generational kin.  Research has shown that age segregation has both belief and practice implications 
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for young adult religiosity; this chapter will help set the stage for the essays in this volume that consider 
whether this is also true for those who are aging.   
 In sum, this chapter discusses the religious and cultural context for studying religion, aging, and 
spirituality by considering the dynamics of diversity, individuation, and their interaction in the religious 
landscape, reviewing recent sociological data to make the case. 
 
Diversity 
The increasing diversity in American religion is unmistakable.  One consistent source of religious 
diversity is the increasing numbers of immigrants to the United States in the last 30-40 years, and the 
different religions represented in those groups of newcomers.  As a number of scholars have documented 
(e.g., Portes & Rumbaut, 2014; Prothero, 2006; Warner & Wittner, 1998; Wuthnow, 2005) the changes in 
immigration policy in 1965 altered both the number of immigrants arriving legally and the regions from 
which those migrants originate.  After a half-century of discouraging immigration from Eastern and 
Southern Europe, Africa, and even longer from Asia, the 1965 Hart-Cellers Act opened up those regions 
to legal immigration.  And while the law placed some restrictions on Latin America that had not been 
there previously (see Zolberg, 2008), other aspects of the new policies, and the economic situation facing 
many Latin American countries, encouraged renewed immigration from Western Hemispheric nations.   
 The result, since the 1970s, has been immigrant numbers from Asian nations unlike anything 
previously in American history.  The increases have been notable for Chinese and Korean immigrants, 
people from Vietnam and Thailand, and South Asian immigrants from India and Pakistan.  Not 
surprisingly, this has produced numbers of Muslim, Hindus, and Buddhists in the United States unlike 
ever before.  Current estimates are that there are about 3.3 million Muslims (c. 1% of the population), 3.8 
million Buddhists (about 1.2%), and about 2.2 million Hindus (about .8%) in the U.S. (see Mohamed, 
2016; see also, PewForum.org, 2014).  Further, events in Eastern Europe that occurred shortly after the 
changes in immigration policy restrictions led to some increased numbers of Polish and Russian Jewish 
immigrants.  The Jewish community remains about 2% of the national population. 
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 These numbers are difficult to state with precision, as the U.S. census does not ask about religion, 
and the reports of numbers by religious groups themselves are notoriously unreliable, and also vary by the 
definition of religious “member.”  Some religious traditions include children, others do not. Some are 
more likely than others to include significant numbers of people who are nominally, or “culturally” 
Jewish or Hindu or whatever without being particularly religiously observant.  Further, not all the non-
Christian diversity comes through immigration, as about 20-25% of American Muslims are African 
American, and Buddhism includes large number of American (usually white) converts.   
 This diversity is actually experienced differentially.  It is more likely in urban places than rural or 
small towns, more likely on either coast than in the Mountain West or the South.  Thus, for those native-
born Christians who live around groups of Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists, their overall small numbers in 
the population will probably seem surprising.  And indeed the numbers are growing.  But it will be a 
while until the numbers get large enough to be caught in random national surveys without specific 
targeting or weighting of the samples.  At present, non-Christian religious diversity is growing, and 
culturally significant, but still numerically fairly small. 
The first generation of these post-1965 non-Christian immigrant groups is aging, while many of 
the second generation are now starting their own families and producing a third generation. Soon, 
American Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists will begin to face issues that American Christians and Jews 
have for some time – how to understand and accommodate the ways in which religious practice changes 
with age, retirement, and eventual infirmity. 
 While the changes in American religious demographics since the 1970s are in many ways 
dramatic, it is important to recognize that religious diversity is in fact an old story in national life.  The 
key is to recognize what gets considered “diversity” in any given historical period.  It is true that many of 
the earliest groups of English and Western European settlers to the New World were fairly homogenous 
ethno-religious groups – and often determined to keep their new colonies that way.  Thus, Puritan 
Massachusetts persecuted religious dissenters and there were debates as to whether African slaves or 
Native Americans were even candidates for religious conversion (e.g., whether they actually had “souls” 
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to save).  But in a thinly settled land, with ever increasing numbers of new arrivals from Europe, 
enforcing such uniformity proved difficult.  The first challenges to religious unity in Massachusetts were 
Baptists and Quakers in the early 18th century (see Demerath & Williams, 1992), but religious minorities 
and the non-religious either migrated to more tolerant Rhode Island or Pennsylvania, or to the ‘frontier’ of 
western Massachusetts, then New York. 
 The Scot-Irish groups that immigrated through the Carolinas and other mid-Atlantic regions in 
the early national period brought yet another type of Protestantism (Fischer, 1989; Hatch, 1989) to the 
country – one increasingly focused on personal experience and individual commitment rather than 
covenanted communities and doctrinal traditions.  Communalist groups such as German Moravians 
moved into frontier areas (and later, Mennonites and Amish) so that they could preserve their distinctive 
religious cultures.  Similarly, homegrown religious diversity began to flourish, as Mormons began in the 
“burn over” district of Western New York, and Disciples of Christ emerged out of Appalachia (see 
Moore, 1986).  Thus, while in 1790 the first census showed only about 1% of the nation to be non-
Protestant, what the Protestants were varied significantly from Congregational New England, through the 
multi-denominational Middle Atlantic, to the Anglican South and all along the frontier (see also, Finke & 
Stark, 1992). 
 Finally, religious diversity has increased due to schisms among established Protestant groups.  
Whether over doctrinal matters, or organizational policies, or particular religious practices, Protestantism 
was born in schism and has continued to fragment, or diversify depending upon one’s view, ever since.  
For example, in the United States the question of slavery ruptured every major Protestant denomination 
between 1840 and 1865, some of which have never re-merged.  But issues such as the proper 
interpretation of the Bible, or the appropriate age for baptism, divided groups even absent national 
political issues. Due to definitional and counting issues, there is little agreement even on the basic number 
of Protestant denominations currently in the U.S.  The Pew Research Center, based on its 2004 survey, 
notes that American Protestantism encompasses “more than a dozen major denominational families – 
such as Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans and Pentecostals . . .[t]hese denominational families, in turn, are 
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made up of a host of different denominations” (PewForum.org, 2005). And this assessment of Protestant 
diversity does not count what have been called “new religious movements” that have emerged out of 
many different established religious traditions (such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Hare Krishnas, the 
Unification Church of the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, the Church of Scientology, just to name a few; see 
Melton, 2002; Lewis, 2003).  In sum, the combination of immigration, schism, hybridity, and religious 




 American culture and society are regularly analyzed for their high levels of “individualism” (see, 
for example, Gans, 1991; Lasch, 1979). Indeed, that it is a cherished cultural value is central to my 
argument here.  But importantly, individualism as a cultural value and presumption is reinforced and 
structured by the legal system and the polity.  The notion that rights – political, social, economic – append 
to individuals is central to U.S. law in almost every respect.  It is as individuals, rather than as members 
of a social or cultural group that we stand before the law.  Even laws meant to redress centuries-old 
problems of discrimination and inequality, such as affirmative action policies, must be structured so that 
such redress does not impermissibly violate the rights of any individual regardless of group status.  The 
result of these structural arrangements, combined with cultural valorization, is a process of individuation 
that reaches both institutionally and in individuals’ lives.  
 Cultural individualism has often come into conflict with the orientations of many religious groups 
(see Williams, 2007).  Many groups of believers see themselves first as a community, a group that stands 
in particular relation to the divine – this is particularly true among religious minorities, or among ethno-
racial minorities.  Thus, there is a tension in law and politics as related to religion; at what point can and 
should the state intervene on behalf of an individual, using an individualist conception of human or legal 
rights, when that individual is embedded in a community that judges certain actions as normative or 
religiously mandated?  Balancing individual rights and the freedom of religion for religious groups, 
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particularly minority religious groups, is the source of contention in many court cases (see Williams 
1995).  In general, the courts have sought to protect children (thus, for example, Christian Scientist adults 
may forego standard medical care, but must provide it for their children) and protect others from physical 
abuse.  But freedom of religion as a property of the community versus an inalienable right of the 
individual continues to trouble the American legal system.   
 The tension is embedded historically.  The Puritan legacy is to understand the righteous society as 
a “community of saints” but it was a community of individually-called saints, a “chosen people” of 
voluntary participants. And yet, the moral regulation of the community at the local level was severe 
(Shain, 1994).  This mirrors a constant predicament facing religious groups – when the criterion for 
membership in the chosen community relies on an act of individualized piety, such as being “born again” 
or experiencing the personal reality of “being on fire for the Lord,” how to accommodate the second and 
then the third generation?  Of course, serious attempts are made to keep youth in the fold through 
education and socialization, but the results are not always what the parents would hope for.  Are children 
then to be excluded?  Over history, many religious groups developed compromise solutions, such as 
Puritan New England’s “Half-way Covenant” (Hall, 2008) or the “Birthright” Quaker status prior to 
complete “convincement” (Levy, 1988). 
 As noted above, however, the tightly ordered religious communities of the early European settlers 
proved difficult to maintain in the U.S. whatever the efforts to do so.  The frontier offered a space where 
institutional control was more difficult, and communal gatherings less frequent and more voluntary.  The 
influx of new pietist Protestant groups and the fervor of the Second Great Awakening made 
individualized expressions of faith more normative.  Some groups, such as the Amish or Moravians, and 
of course, the Mormons, managed to maintain themselves as tightly knit ethno-religious communities – 
there was social and geographical room to do that.  But the impulse toward individualism in belief and 
practices became a deeply set cultural trend, facilitated by social, geographic, and legal features of the 
growing nation. 
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The embeddedness of individualism in American culture can be seen in some of the political and 
social trends of the late-19th-early 20th century, even when some of those trends were in putative 
opposition to each other.  The period 1880 to 1920 (generally) spanned two eras that historians generally 
refer to as the “Gilded Age” (see Cashman, 1993) and the “Progressive Era” (see Pastorello, 2014)  The 
former is noted as a period of rapidly increasing wealth and inequality (with the beginnings of an 
ideology of “Social Darwinism” to justify it), while the latter is notable for its attempts at increasing 
direct democracy (for example, through adding the “initiative” and “referendum” to many state 
constitutions, amending the Constitution to provide for the direct election of U.S. Senators, and attacks on 
urban political machines).  The entire time period was one of rapid urbanization and industrialization, and 
not surprisingly, was also marked by movements resisting these trends (such as the Populism of the South 
and Midwest, often represented by William Jennings Bryan; see Kazin, 1998).  And throughout the era 
immigrant numbers were high, particularly from Eastern and Southern Europe, and particularly people 
who were Catholic or Jewish.  And again, not surprisingly, there was significant nativist backlash against 
such immigration, much of it couched in religious terms (Williams 2016). 
What is significant about this period for the purposes of this essay was the assumptions about the 
value of individualism – often promoted by both sides of the political and social cleavages.  The 
Protestant concern with Catholic immigrants often involved the latter’s alleged failure to respect the 
individual, subordinating him or her to rigid church doctrine that discouraged independent thought and 
the free-will conversion experience Protestants thought essential for salvation.  On the other hand, many 
Progressives were concerned about the capacities for poor Catholic and Jewish immigrants to succeed in 
American society and responded with outreach programs that encouraged “Americanization” – aspects of 
which included learning and speaking English, abandoning “old world” customs, and embracing Anglo-
Saxon values (e.g., Pastorello, 2014, 22-23, 173).  In all of this, the centrality of the individual to the 
American, and Protestant, worldview became even more salient as a crucial distinction between what 
made the United State “exceptional” compared to the “old” world.  Thus was individuation furthered.  
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 While it might give an historian heart palpitations to jump so quickly from the early national 
period, to the turn of the 20th century, to the 1960s, I do so here to illustrate both the continuity of 
individualism as a tendency in American religion, and to point to particular periods of accelerated social 
change. Thus, the explosion of cultural individualism in the era colloquially known as ‘the sixties’ was 
not a revolution in the sense of introducing a completely new cultural landscape and meaning system to 
society, such as replacing the Orthodox Czarist regime with atheistic state socialism in 1917. Rather, the 
sixties in the U.S. took themes embedded deeply in American market capitalist ideology and applied them 
to middle-class social mores, promising a similar type of personal liberty, defined as freedom from 
external institutional constraint.  The notion of “do your own thing” – and the presumption that such a 
dictum could and should be available to all with little worry about the health of the collective – was nicely 
aligned with Adam Smith’s contention that the pursuit of private interests would result in a public good.  
Like market capitalism, the cultural system assumed that moral individuals would engage in moral 
actions, with less theoretical attention to how such moral individuals were to be created. 
 I am not voicing a cultural conservative dismissal of ‘60s politics. Groups of Americans who had 
been systematically excluded from full participation as citizens in socio-political life – from African 
Americans to women to Latinx workers to gay and lesbian persons – challenged the institutional and 
cultural arrangements of their oppression. But one of the ways this manifested in longer term cultural 
change was emphasizing individual “rights” (Glendon, 1991; Skrentny, 2002), and, importantly, 
magnifying a deep distrust of established institutions and the “elites” who ran them. Political scientists 
Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider identified this as “the confidence gap” (1983) and showed 
that the suspicion of elites had spread from government (where anti-war sentiment regarding Viet Nam 
amplified an existing wariness of “politicians”) to institutions such as business and labor, creating a 
changed cultural climate. Mark Chaves (2017, 82-87) brings this up-to-date in terms of the leadership of 
established religious institutions. Starting in the 1970s, but accelerated rapidly by the televangelist 
scandals of the late 1990s and the Catholic clerical abuse publicity of the early 2000s, trust in religious 
leaders had diminished considerably. 
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 Declining trust in institutions, including religious institutions, is manifested in less direct ways as 
well.  One significant trend, I argue, is the rise of people describing themselves as “spiritual but not 
religious” (SBNR). While the size and significance of this trend is a matter of some scholarly debate, the 
phrase itself is taken to mean that people are affirming a personal, individualized sense of the spiritual, of 
something beyond the material world, or even a type of personal relationship with some aspect of the 
transcendent or divine. But they are denying that they find this in “religion” – presumably organized 
religion and its institutionalized doctrines. An early example of this orientation in the sociology of 
religion literature is in Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton’s Habits of the Heart (1985), in 
which one respondent distances herself from any religious tradition, but indicates she has a faith grounded 
in her own inner voice that both focuses on taking care of herself as well as guides her actions towards 
others; she calls it “Sheilaism” (1985,221).  Bellah and his colleagues point to this as a self-centered 
“expressive individualism” run amok, cutting people off from “communities of memory” and meaningful 
social relationships. They also note, with displeasure, that in a 1978 Gallup poll 80% of respondents 
thought it both possible and positive to develop one’s moral sensibility and beliefs about life without the 
guidance of a religious institution (Bellah, et al., 1985, 228). Bellah, et al. note quite rightly that one main 
purpose of these very organizations is to help shape individuals’ moral lives and frameworks, but various 
strains of cultural individualism have convinced many Americans not only that they don’t need such 
institutionalized guidance, but that it is somehow better, more virtuous, and more authentic to come to 
such understandings without the help of institutional authorities. 
While Bellah, et al. did not use the phrase SBNR, other scholars have, and have often either 
implied or disputed its importance or magnitude. For example, Smith & Denton (2005) find little 
evidence of “spiritual but not religious” in their study of youth religiosity. Many of their respondents saw 
spirituality and religion as linked, and the idea of separating the two did not really resonate with them 
(e.g., 2005, 27). However, while small numbers reported that SBNR was “very true” for them (8%), a 
significant number called it “somewhat true” (46%). And of the teens that described themselves as “non-
religious” 13% said “very true” and 49% said “somewhat true” (2005, 77-78). Interestingly, what the 
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authors did find wide-spread was an outlook and orientation they labelled “Moralistic Therapeutic 
Deism” (MTD).  This was a generalized orientation to being a good person and treating others well, and 
included the assumption that connection to a deistic transcendent power was important for its therapeutic 
support to them – such as comforting and sustaining them in hard times (2005, 163-164). Smith & Denton 
despair over how widespread this orientation is; they would prefer that youth hold a theologically 
developed and clearly thought out set of religious beliefs, and are critical of religious institutions for not 
countering moralistic therapeutic deism, and its implied pop culture, self-help attributes, with more 
articulated and considered theological beliefs.  That the MTD orientation might align with a formulation 
of “spiritual but not religious” in terms of emphasizing self-oriented needs and fulfillment is not 
considered in their dismissal of SBNR, nor do they engage interviewees’ expressions of similar 
sentiments, even when the SBNR phrase itself is absent (e.g., 2005, 14, 80-81). 
Other scholars, without employing the scolding tone used by Smith & Denton, also take issue 
with the SBNR formulation.  Nancy Ammerman (2013) examines constructions of spirituality found in 
in-depth interviews with American adults.  She found four “cultural packages” of meanings that 
conceptualize spirituality in different ways, with some fuzzy boundaries and overlapping among them.  
Many respondents understood spirituality as deeply connected to religion, and again, few used the phrase 
“spiritual but not religious,” leading her to conclude that SBNR is more of a moral and political category 
than an empirical one.  Nonetheless, a not-insignificant number of her respondents disconnected their 
spirituality from institutional authority.  In a similar formulation, Warner (2014) wrote “in defense of 
religion” as a conceptual category and notes religion’s analytic distinction from spirituality (religion 
being connected to community while spirituality connects individuals to sources of ultimate meaning); 
Warner argues sensibly that the two concepts need not be antithetical, nor can religion be totally absorbed 
by spirituality. 
Scholarly doubts notwithstanding, Mark Chaves (2017) found the number of Americans willing 
to understand their own spirituality in ways aligned to SBNR to be increasing.  His findings are drawn 
from GSS survey data, and involve responses to two different questions, asking whether the respondent 
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considered themselves a religious person and whether they considered themselves a spiritual person.  He 
found that the number of people answered “not” or “slightly” to the first question was growing, but a 
portion of these same people did not answer that way to the question about whether they were spiritual – 
thus they were disclaiming a religious identity while claim some spiritual connection. Chaves found the 
number of people with this array of answers to have risen from 9% in 1998 to 14% in 2006-08 to 16% in 
2010-14. He notes that people are both less likely to call themselves “religious,” but more likely to think 
of themselves as “spiritual” (2017, p.38). These finds are echoed, using analysis of the same pair of 
questions that Chaves examined, but with higher numbers and a more dramatic increase, in a recent Pew 
Research Center report. That report shows 19% fitting the SBNR category in 2012 and 27% doing so in 
2017 (Lipka & Gecewicz, 2017). 
These findings dovetail with the well-known trend in both GSS and Pew survey data that shows a 
significant increase in those people identifying as religious “nones” but without a concomitant rise in the 
number who are atheists; that is, many who answer “none” for affiliation still profess beliefs in God or a 
Higher Power, often believe in life after death, and engage in private religious practices such as prayer 
(see Baker & Smith, 2009; Chaves, 2017). In sum, SBNR may be oversold in popular culture – and may 
be most apparent among well-educated middle-class whites who tend to score highly on many measures 
of individualism (though not solely there) – but it represents a real trend in the individuation of American 
belief and more evidence of general suspicion of institutional authority. 
 Other scholars writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s emphasized individualism in American 
religious practice. Philip Hammond (1992) called it the “third disestablishment” – the first was the legal 
separation of church and state in the Constitution, the second was the displacing of the Protestant cultural 
establishment after World War II, and the third was the abandoning of religious institutional authority 
after the 1960s. Religion became increasingly susceptible to the drive for “personal autonomy,” at the 
cost of institutional authority and with increasing cultural hybridity. 
 Wade Clark Roof (1993; 1999) wrote similarly, but pegged these changes particularly to the rise 
and maturing of the “baby boom” generation.  They became a “generation of seekers” who foregrounded 
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personal fulfillment, reserved for themselves the right to adjudicate the appropriateness of religio-moral 
teachings offered by religious authorities, and had an in-and-out relationship to organizational belonging. 
Boomers feel free to move on, seeking the religious style and community that they felt (and feel) best fit 
their needs.  At about this same time, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, who later became Pope Benedict XVI, 
became associated with the phrase “cafeteria Catholic” as a disparaging way to characterize those 
members of the faith who felt entitled to pick-and-choose among church teachings. D’Antonio, Davidson, 
Hoge, & Meyer (2001) did not use that normative language, but clearly found evidence for an increased 
sense of choice, particularly among younger generations of Catholics, as did Patrick McNamara (1992), 
who characterized young Catholics as following “conscience first, tradition second.” 
 Extracting personal religious identity and sacred meaning-systems from institutional participation 
and authority can be found in other, more recent, research as well. Jerome Baggett (2009) did interviews 
and a survey with parishioners from six Roman Catholic parishes in Northern California – generally the 
East Bay area.  His survey found that solid majorities thought it possible to be a “good Catholic” without 
going to church every Sunday (61%), without their marriage being approved by the Church (61%), 
without obeying the teachings on divorce and remarriage (60%), and without believing in the infallibility 
of the pope (59%) (2009, p. 29). Baggett notes that these percentages are lower than some other national 
survey, but that they are significant because he was surveying people who were active in a parish. Further, 
only 38% of his respondents claimed that the “teaching authority” of the Vatican was “very important” to 
them, while 89% said that “spirituality and personal growth” was very important (2009, p. 68). Clearly, 
even many active church-goers were finding meaning distinct from institutional authority, or at least 
claimed to. 
 On occasion, I refer to Hammond, Roof, and colleagues as the “California School” in the 
sociology of religion – referring both to their institutional affiliations and the sites of much of their 
research. Their work may reflect the perhaps accentuated individualism of the Left Coast.  However, 
historian Doug Rossinow (1998) reveals some similar dynamics in the “politics of authenticity” in 1960s 
“new left” in Texas. Rossinow demonstrated that liberal Christians developed a keen sense of “moral 
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individualism” as a way of resisting the conformist conservative evangelical Protestantism on issues such 
as racial segregation, the Viet Nam War, and the women’s movement. While many of these people 
worked to try to manage an individualism that was balanced with commitment to community (especially 
across racial lines) the touchstone of “authenticity” remained the individual conscience. The notion that 
religious authenticity emerges from individual reflection and choice remains a hallmark in many young 
people’s thinking, especially white young adults (e.g., Williams, Irby, & Warner, 2016).  
 While the individuation of religious belief and commitment is a wide and deep cultural trend in 
American society and religion, it does not affect all racial, ethnic, or religious groups equally.  It is more 
common among white, college-educated, middle-class people (where Gans, 1991 located “middle 
American individualism”).  It is less common among religious groups who are religious and/or racial 
minorities in the U.S. (e.g., Williams, et al., 2016), in part because community cohesion is a good way to 
manage some of the precarity of societal life in those situations.  Nonetheless, there is evidence (e.g., 
Min, 2010; Williams, 2011; Williams & Vashi, 2007) of second-generation members of immigrant 
families using the language of “choice” and individual decision-making when discussing their own 
religious commitments – community often matters deeply to them, but they negotiate that commitment 
within a framework that clearly values the individual conscience and volitional decision-making as 
integral to the authenticity of their religious identities. 
 
 
Diversity and individuation intersect 
Diversity need not be accompanied by individualism – multicultural pluralism can exist at the 
community level, and religion can remain a more or less ascribed characteristic even as the sheer varieties 
of religion within a society increase. And, as noted, many groups of religious and/or ethno-racial 
minorities do not put as high a value on individualism and individual autonomy as do many native-born, 
white Americans. But a valuing of diversity, culturally as well as in legal frameworks, along with 
individualism together pose a significant challenge that can result in the fracturing of traditional and 
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corporatist forms of community.  It can also lead to synthetic religious creations and a cultural hybridity 
that many would describe as creative and positive innovations. 
However, there is no question that the two processes, in the context of declining confidence in 
institutional leaders, a generalized distrust of “elites,” and work and family lives that are ever more 
speeded up and mobile, have resulted in declining connection to the most common form of American 
religious expression – the congregation.  Robert Putnam (2000), among others, pointed to declining 
participation in voluntary associations – including religious congregations – as damaging to American 
civil society. Chaves (2017) has assembled forty years of GSS data and three waves of the National 
Congregational Survey (NCS) and finds clear trends: fewer Americans belong to religious congregations, 
fewer Americans look to congregations as sites of religious and life authority, fewer Americans attend 
worship services regularly, and those that do are increasingly older. The patterns are distinct enough that 
he terms in a “decline” in the forms of “traditional” religiosity. The religious congregation is far from 
dead – or even dying – as it remains the most common form of voluntary association in the U.S. and is 
consistently shown to have positive effects on many aspects of life for participants. But participants are 
more irregular, more selective, and less fully committed over the life course than they once were.   
 Americans have more religious choices than ever. There are more different religions, and more 
congregations/temples/practitioners of each of the major world religions, than there ever were. It is 
increasingly acceptable to adopt and adapt practices from one tradition, even while not fully embracing 
that faith or abandoning one’s received identity – the trajectory of Buddhism’s “mindfulness” in 
American culture is evidence for that (Wilson, 2013), or the popular recognition of the concept of 
“JUBU” – Jewish and Buddhist (Kamenetz, 1994). Religious culture, in many ways, has been 
increasingly commodified, especially in popular culture industries, giving believers the opportunity to 
“consume” religion even more selectively. And the proliferation of media platforms, from talk radio to 
televangelism to web-based worship (Cowan, 2005) has also increased the numbers of ways in which 
religion can be experienced privately or selectively.   
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 In the debates over “secularization” that have characterized sociology of religion for some time, 
too much of the debate had an ‘is not, is too’ quality – that is, that religion was either declining and fading 
away, or was vibrant and dynamic.  The possibility that both could be true, at least in part depending upon 
the changing forms and expressions of religious life, was too often ignored. That may well be the lesson 
here – the intersection of diversity and individuation, coupled with a clear decline in institutionalized 
religious authority, means that many Americans insist on carving out their own forms of spiritual and 
religious expression, and have many more forms and resources available with which to do so. The locus 
of religious authority has shifted to the individual, and experimentation and personalization are legitimate 
outcomes.  Declaring oneself an atheist still arouses suspicion among many Americans (e.g., Edgell, 
Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; Edgell, Hartmann, Stewart & Gerteis, 2016), but being a religious “none,” 
calling oneself “spiritual but not religious,” or maintaining a ‘cultural’ connection to one’s faith tradition, 
rather than an observant one, are increasingly common and acceptable. 
 
What this may mean for religion, spirituality, and aging 
 The basic claim of this essay is clear – the increasing diversity of religious options in the U.S. 
combines with a deeply embedded cultural valuing of individual decision-making and self-fulfillment to 
produce a religious landscape that is ever more varied, and one in which people are able, and often 
expected, to tailor their belief and practice commitments to their own needs. Institutionalized religious 
authority has less sway than organizational images of hierarchy would imply and the legitimacy and 
acceptance of being without a faith, or without a religious community, is increasing. What do these 
institutional and cultural trends mean for religion, spirituality, and aging? This entire volume offers a set 
of well-researched answers to this question; I close here by only suggesting some things worth observing, 
in terms of belief systems, religious practices, and religious organizations and communities. 
 Regarding religious beliefs, it seems fairly safe to expect ever greater diversity and cultural 
hybridities, and having them legitimated by individual experience and needs. Combinations of traditions, 
such as JUBUs, or charismatic Catholics, should increase. Even one consistent negative reaction to 
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cultural blending – that of renewed orthodoxy or fundamentalism – will be filtered through the 
worldviews and practices of a culture that is already non-traditional. There is substantial evidence that a 
satisfying spiritual life is helpful in promoting good health among the aging – the capacity to make that 
spiritual life personalized and individually salient would seem to have never been greater. Some scholars 
note that such religious innovations as “spiritual but not religious” are particularly acute among the Baby 
Boom generation – that is, the effects of the 1960s cultural trends are more salient for them than other 
generations. Since this is the current generation that is retiring and moving into old age, the availability of 
options and the valuing of individuation seems made for them. 
 However, another important dimension of the beneficial aspects of religion (on physical and 
mental health, life satisfaction, etc.) is the involvement in a community – basically, a congregation. 
Congregations can offer social and emotional support, networks that are both instrumentally useful (say, 
for example, for a ride to a doctor’s appointment) and expressive, and a doctrine and values that 
emphasizes self-care and health. These are of great assistance to health and help people resist anxiety, 
depression, and loneliness. Thus, the decline in congregation involvement and attendance may be social 
factors that undercut the potential positive benefits of an agreeable spiritual life. There are a number of 
reasons that older people may not be particularly active in a religious congregation – whether they were 
raised in a non-religious household, or have health issues, or have competing life demands, or have 
relocated upon retirement and have difficulty connecting with a new community. But the general decline 
in congregational involvement may well have a potentially negative effect on the health and general well-
being of the aging, and on congregations themselves. 
 Religious congregations in the U.S. overwhelmingly run on volunteer labor. As such, it is not 
surprising that American religious congregations flourished post-World War II – the widespread 
development of the suburban, one-income, nuclear family was an excellent source of that kind of effort. 
Volunteer labor from “stay-at-home” mothers became the backbone of much church programming 
(Edgell, 2005). Further, this arrangement also facilitated a clear shift in programming interest to children 
and young adults – thus, the “young family” became the symbol of a thriving congregation. 
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But the shifts in family structures, such as more women in full-time work force, or more single 
parenting, has left many congregations struggling to keep up. Focusing on young families has sometimes 
meant that senior congregational members are relatively neglected, and differentiated programming can 
increase the age-segregation already in society. At least at this point, it seems clear that the large numbers 
of retiring Baby Boomers are not going to be a surge in volunteering for local religious congregations 
(Seaman, 2012). As noted, Boomers are less organizational in their religious commitments and less 
religious overall, and may have gotten used to the relative professionalization of congregational services 
that marked the flush periods of the late 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, there is evidence that 
Boomers are more likely to volunteer generally than the generations before them (Einolf, 2009), so it may 
well continue into retirement – but that may not be in religious congregations specifically. 
 While all these trends portend potential challenges for religious congregations and their 
leadership as people approach retirement and old age, doomsday scenarios may be unwarranted. Robert 
Wuthnow (2002) engaged the literature on the organizational crisis in American civil society – 
represented by Putnam’s (2000) analysis – and offered a slightly different take. Rather than a “decline” he 
saw a shift in the forms of association. That is, it may be true that older organizational forms were 
experiencing some decline, and this would include the religious congregation, but it was not true that 
associations were dead. New types of connections, more fluid, more episodic in life, were vibrant and 
growing.  He called them “loose connections” but still acknowledged their importance. 
 In this way, religious organizational life may be transforming a bit like religious belief is. There is 
a decline in traditional beliefs, and in many traditional ways of belonging. But belief and belonging are 
not dead, they are being transformed into different forms and with changing dynamics. As American 
society moves into a period of a large generation retiring, and people living longer, the ways in which 
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